Administrative Law, Securities, Foreign & International Law, Communication Policy, Law 

Historically, two issues have dominated the study of regulatory agencies: first, how their goals are defined and achieved, and second, how their 'behaviour' can be explained. The influence of public and private interests on agencies has always been taken as central to understanding the outcomes of regulation.Mary Condon argues that the study of interests is not a straightforward task. Interests can be incoherent and they can shift and change over time. We often leap to the conclusion that regulations are made specifically to benefit certain constituents, when in fact other forces are also at play. Our notion of a distinct public/private divide among interests may also be flawed. Condon proposes a new approach to the problem. She urges us to examine the ideas behind regulation, their source, and how they have been interpreted by the regulators, the regulated, and other interests. She argues that interests and ideas are mutually constructed: for example, ideas can be reshaped by the interests that they originally spawned. In this book, Condon applies this interpretative approach to the case of Ontario securities regulation. She considers legislation, policy making, and regulatory undertakings from 1945 through the 1970s.Making Disclosure provides an excellent example of how ideas and interests influence policy. It is an important source text for courses on law and policy making and it contains valuable insights for observers of regulation. It breaks new ground for professionals in the securities industry and readers who are interested in regulatory decision making and the process of legislative reform. - from Amzon 

Includes bibliographical references (235) and index.
Donated by Graham Price.