The behavior of federal judges : a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice
Type
Book
Authors
ISBN 10
0674049896
ISBN 13
9780674049895
DDC
347.73
Category
American Law
[ Browse Items ]
Publication Year
2013
Publisher
Pages
xv, 422 pages
Subject
American General Law
Tags
Abstract
"Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well-understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made"--Provided by publisher
Description
Content:
A realistic theory of judicial behavior -- The previous empirical literature -- The Supreme Court -- The Courts of Appeals -- The district courts and the selection effect -- Dissents and dissent aversion -- The questioning of lawyers at oral argument -- The auditioners.
A realistic theory of judicial behavior -- The previous empirical literature -- The Supreme Court -- The Courts of Appeals -- The district courts and the selection effect -- Dissents and dissent aversion -- The questioning of lawyers at oral argument -- The auditioners.
Biblio Notes
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Item catalogued by specific Author (Posner), then by title per Brenda's request.
Note: Richard A. Posner collection located off-shelf in Archives room. Please speak to LASA staff for assistance and retrieval.
Item catalogued by specific Author (Posner), then by title per Brenda's request.
Note: Richard A. Posner collection located off-shelf in Archives room. Please speak to LASA staff for assistance and retrieval.
Number of Copies
1
